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BULGARIA, PERESTROIKA, GLASNOST AND MANAGEMENT 
Recent developments in Eastern Europe have spectacularly caught the 
headlines. Under the banners of Perestroika and Glasnost, the peoples of eastern 
Europe have expressed their desire for greater freedoms, not only in the political but 
also in the economic sphere. Long queues in front of virtually empty shops starkly 
point up the inefficiencies of the economic system of countries in Eastern Europe 
such as Bulgaria. 
Leaders and experts in Eastern Europe want to remedy this situation and 
there have been moves to forge links with industrial and commercial Western 
enterprises (joint ventures) and seek the expertise of institutions of management 
education. Cranfield for example, has recently agreed a joint contract with the 
Bulgarians and the Robert Maxwell Organisation. The School also has links with 
Hungary, one of the most progressively westernised of the Eastern bloc states. 
In the wake of events in Poland and East Germany, the Bulgarians too have 
ousted their long standing leader Todor Zhivkov and began a series of reforms. This 
paper attempts to give some explanation for these developments with particular 
reference to Bulgaria. 
Bulgaria has a population of 8.9 million a significant minority of whom are 
Turks, Gypsies and Greeks. It is situated to the west of the Black Sea, and is 
bounded by Turkey and Greece in the South, Hungary and Rumania to the North 
and Yugoslavia to the West. 
It has fertile agricultural land producing plentiful crops of cotton, tobacco, 
maize, vegetables and Mediterranean fruits, including grapes, the last of which has 
supplied an internationally successful wine export business. However, it is not very 
rich in natural resources and until the 1950’s the predominant occupational sector was 
agriculture. 
In 1949 the Communist Government set up the apparatus whereby the 
Bulgarian economy was to be weaned from its ‘over dependence’ on agriculture and 
was to develop a heavy industrial base. The land was nationalised and collectivised. 
This was a formidable task as it was divided into 1 .I million private holdings. 
Predictably the agricultural policy gave rise to serious social and political unrest 
which was only suppressed by methods reminiscent of those used by Stalin in the 
1930’s. 
After the death, in 1949, of Georgi Dimitrov (the founder of the post war 
communist state), the leadership passed into the hands of the pro-Stalinist Vulko 
Chervenko, who continued the industrialisation policies in a vigorous and brutal 
manner. The element of fear thus created posed a huge obstacle to democratic 
change as people were reluctant to speak out in case they found themselves in 
contravention of the Party line. The best protection was to become a Communist 
Party member, and between 1944 and 1948 Party membership figures rose from 
15,000 to 460,000. Many of these new members were aparatchiks and careerists, only 
too ready to endorse the Party line and discredit rivals to further their own 
ambitions. The Bulgarian dissident writer Georgi Markov vividly describes such 
people: 
“Uneducated, half literate and intellectually insignificant citizens 
suddenly found themselves occupying important posts purely because of local 
Party connections, and yet entirely in the spirit of overall Party policy. 
Innumerable times in my own work (as a shop floor worker and later middle 
manager) I collided with unbelievably mediocre and entirely inadequate 
directors, heads of sections and ministerial department chiefs. My colleagues 
still remember their legendary inanities. Incapable of thinking for themselves 
or taking decisions on complex questions of production, they were utterly 
obedient, blind instruments of those who had appointed them.” 
“For many years they ruined whole industries with their incompetence, 
lack of experience and, above all, dishonesty and selfishness. They were 
greedy, avid for success and did not spare either people or materials in order 
to be able to report some supposed achievement, which eventually turned out 
to be either a fraud or else to have been attained at much too high a 
price.” (1) 
A society permeated by fear and distrust creates a conspiracy of silence and 
such an atmosphere does not allow critical appraisal of the problems with which it is 
faced. If the problems are not publicly recognised then it is impossible to remedy 
them. In this fashion a self perpetuating bureaucracy contains its problems through 
force, like a lid on a pressure cooker. 
The second major problem which afflicted Eastern Europe was the rigid 
ideolo gical base from which flowed all political economic decision making. Stalin’s 
hurried industrialisation of the Soviet Union in the 1930’s became the model for all 
other communist states. Chervenko and his successor, Todor Zhivkov, who came to 
power in 1956 slavishly emulated the Soviet model despite its limitation for Bulgaria 
which lacked the necessary raw materials for heavy industrialisation. 
He continues 
A series of five year plans turned Bulgaria from an agricultural to a 
predominantly industrial country, as the table below reveals. 
1934 1956 1983 
Agriculture 69% 70% 2 1% 
Industry 14% 16% 45% 
Occupational Distribution in Bulgaria 
As the agricultural sector declined in relative terms plans were made to enter 
the iron and steel industry in a concerted way in the 1970’s. Bulgaria lacks sufficient 
iron ore and is largely reliant on imported sources. There was a need to ‘buy in’ 
foreign expertise and embark on long employee training programmes, as well as 
invest huge capital sums in the infrastructure of such an ambitious enterprise. 
. A similar scheme was developed in the oil industry. Bulgaria was totally 
reliant on subsidised oil imports from the Soviet Union and yet it set up a huge oil 
refinery near Burgas on the Black Sea, which now pollutes large areas of the 
surrounding shoreline. These enterprises were developed when world markets in both 
these areas were plummeting. 
Agricultural exports were used to prop up these disastrous schemes often at 
the expense of the Bulgarian people who saw food produce ‘disappear from their 
shops to further the export drive to pay for these industries. 
The third consequence of such a system was the development of a second 
economy where official currency exchange rates were far below black market rates. 
In such an underground system barter and ‘favours’ play an important role. In the 
Soviet Union it is called ‘blag’ and in Bulgaria ‘vruska’, which means ties or 
connections. Managers and workers would appropriate various useful products to 
which they had access and use them as barter for items in short supply. Favours 
were returned for other favours or goods. For example, a butcher might keep special 
cuts of meat for a person in a car enterprise allocation office in return for being put 
further up the waiting list for a new car. Such a system operated in all levels of 
society and throughout Eastern Europe. In essence the system was only made 
workable by a network of clandestine and often illegal and corrupt practices in which 
the lowest and the highest members of the communist state were involved. Thus the 
appointment of a manager meant that his or her success was as much reliant on their 
network of influential acquaintances and contacts as the required skills and 
knowledge of the jab.(2) 
Combined with these influences was a general malaise of poor quality 
products and erratic delivery of supplies. In the face of all these problems the 
factory or enterprise had to fulfil often unrealistically high targets set by planners, 
who usually did not take into account supply shortages. Not surprisingly managers 
became past masters of the manipulation of statistics in order to display fulfilment or 
overfulfilment of plan targets. Markov testifies of his experiences in a Bulgarian 
factory in the 1950’s: 
“During that time I learned an unwritten rule. ‘It is not important to finish 
your work, the important thing is to render an account of it!’ This rule led to 
all sorts of production tricks, the gist of which was to report on work which 
had not been carried out. In order to report an overfulfilment of the plan, 
the production targets were deliberately set well below the capacity of the 
works. 43) 
Haraszti, the Hungarian dissident writer, attests to similar practices in a 
Hungarian engineering factory in the 1960’~(~). This example can be replicated in all 
eastern European states.(5) The system was as much entrenched in Bulgaria in the 
1980’s as it was thirty years before if we are to believe Zhivkov in a speech railing 
against the quality of Bulgarian goods. (6) 
Even foreign products manufactured under licence, in some of the joint 
ventures, he said, had been ‘Bulgarised’ - a word which in essence has come to mean 
low quality production. Zhivkov blamed poor controls, weak labour discipline and 
the lack of incentive. Although such reforms were needed, the problems were more 
deeply rooted, and would mean the denial and criticism of policies that he himself 
had played a major part in creating. 
The lack of motivation of the workforce was well known in Bulgaria and 
Eastern Europe. Incentive systems did exist in the form of bonus payment schemes, 
but they were operated in a way in which workers could work to exhaustion to 
increase output, with a consequent lack of quality. All enterprises had their ‘norms’ 
departments staffed with specialists, who set the targets for each work group and 
individual. Basic wages were set at a low level so that the worker had to strain to 
fulfil the norm. “But the norm was not something permanent: as soon as it was 
overfulfilled by ten per cent, that was the signal to raise it. ‘t(7) Stronger and more 
skillful workers annihilated the weaker and more clumsy ones, as the Stakhanovites 
had done in Stalin’s Russia. 
What of the trade unions? Why did they not attempt to protect the workers’ 
rights? The main reason was that although trade unions appeared on paper to be 
independent representatives of the workforce in reality they were appointed by Party 
officials and managing directors. As miners in Western Siberia, Donetz and 
Kazakhstan explained during last year’s strike: “Trade Unions in many areas are 
simply not defending their members . . . In fact, trade union committees have up to 
now been controlled by and responsible to the local Communist Party 
organisations . . . and are often laid open to accusations of favouritism or 
injustices . . . (unions) should be independent of the Communist Party and the 
Government.“(8) 
It is interesting to note that workers in the heavier industries such as coal 
mining are more militant than in other economic sectors and one of the major 
reasons for this is the inability of miners to engage in ‘blag’ or ‘vruska’ to the same 
extent, for example, as shop workers who have access to consumer goods and 
services. 
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Attempts at reform  were made on many occasions in Bulgaria and Eastern 
Europe in the 1960’s and the 1970’s with periodic purges of corrupt Party and public 
figures, but these failed to have any lasting effect. Endeavours were made to 
restructure work organisation under the Brigade system in the 1970’s but -economic 
slump in the early 1980’s undermined these radical reforms in Bulgaria. The basic 
idea was considered a good one, however, as it was felt that greater democratisation 
and allowance for group and individual initiative in the work place could improve 
quality and output. Even the failed, previous experiments seemed to indicate this. 
The Brigade System 
The major Bulgarian reform  was to introduce ‘planning from  below’ in the 
form  of a counter plan devised by the workforce which would allow them to devise 
targets beyond the plan which were created and controlled by themselves. In 
addition, workers’ and managers’ wages and salaries were linked to performance. 
This was known as the Brigade System and its roots go back to the Soviet Union in 
the 1920’s. The new type of Brigade was “to operate on the principle of internal cost 
accounting” and the money earned would be distributed by the Brigade according to 
qualifications and the personal contributions of every member. The emphasis was to 
be on the economic criterion of efficiency and quality of production. (9) 
A Brigade, on average, is made up to 50 to 70 workers, and each enterprise is 
divided into such brigades. Obviously there is variation in size depending on the 
plant. In very large organisations brigades could contain as many as 200 to 300 
workers, and in smaller enterprises more commonly, 20 to 50 workers. 
All Brigade members make the Brigade Assembly which elects the Brigade 
leader annually, as well as a Brigade Council. The Shop Steward (Profgruporg) and 
Safety Representative are elected by the Trade Union Assembly, which in effect has 
the same membership as the Brigade Assembly. The Brigade Party Group, ie 
Communist Party members, also have the right to elect a Brigade Party organiser, but 
neither the Brigade Party organiser nor shop steward have the power over the 
Brigade Leader. 
The reformed Brigade system was widespread in Bulgaria by the m id 1980’s 
and given further backing by the economic reforms introduced in January 1987. 
The aim of the new Brigade was to create incentives without exploitation, and 
involvement without alienation. The Brigade existed to promote collective 
consciousness and responsibility while at the same time rewarding individual effort. 
Thus the five major functions of the Brigade were seen to be: 
1. Overseeing and enhancing production technology 
2. Responsibility for machinery 
3. Integration of tasks 
4. Feasibility of accounting for results so that they can be attributed to 
the Brigade 
5. The recognition of the Brigade as a social as well as a production unit. 
The Brigade also has rights in approving the counter plan, agreements with 
management, rules and regulations, distribution of earnings, disciplinary measures 
and the admission and dismissal of workers to the Brigade team. 
In this way, it is hoped that the improvement in the quality of working life 
would make for an improvement in the quality and quantity of production. The 
Brigades, for example, would put pressure on managers to ensure the flow of raw 
materials and regularity of supplies. By making the Brigade and its individual 
members responsible for machines this would assure that they would be carefully 
maintained bringing reductions in maintenance costs and loss of production due to 
breakdown. 
, 
The system has only been in widespread use for less than two years and 
recent events have overtaken these attempts at reform within the communist regime. 
There has been a demand for market economy policies of the type in practice in 
Western Europe, the belief being that prosperity will be assured, and the shops will 
be filled with consumer goods so enticingly on display in Western shopping malls. 
The initial euphoria, however, is beginning to wear off and a more realistic 
appraisal of the glasnost economies is taking place. Recognition of the enormity of 
the task is the first stage followed by a down to earth assessment of the capabilities 
of the economy. Is it possible that Poland can turn into a Belgium overnight or 
Czechoslovakia into a West Germany? This is improbable not only due to the 
restraints which the Communist regimes of the past imposed on the economies but . 
also the restrictions of the present potentialities of the economy. 
Bulgaria and Romania are, for example, primarily agricultural economies, c 
at least not heavy industrially based. Both countries have extraordinary fertile Ian 
and have therefore, the ability not only to feed their relatively small populations bt 
provide agricultural exports to fund other enterprises; but these enterprises need t 
be compatible to the natural proclivities of the economy. Thus the manufacture c 
iron, steel and chemical petrol products is counter productive in any economy whit 
relies heavily on imports of raw materials and is part of an extremely competitiv 
world market dominated by Germany, Japan, USSR and USA. 
Bulgaria could, like Japan, make use of its well-educated workforce, but thi 
begs the question - educated for what? The curriculum for schools and college 
certainly needs to be less theoreticially based and more practically orientated toward 
‘Third Wave’ newer industries such as computers and electronics. Bulgaria ha 
already made an attempt to enter the computer market but lacks quality productiol 
in both hard and soft ware. It still does not have the abilities to produce silicon fo 
the chips and the electronic hardware needs more quality control to assure reliabilit: 
and user friendliness. 
Another major problem presently grossly underestimated, is the need tl 
change attitudes in working and managerial practicies. The system based on barte 
and favours will have to go if an efficient economy is to be remotely achievable 
However, initiatives in changing social attitudes are notoriously difficult as there an 
often too many vested interests in the old system. 
In addition industrial iniative and responsibily will need to be encouraged 
Under the old system employees throughout the workforce were loathe to tak 
decisions for .if they were wrong they would get blamed, and in making mistake 
would pay a heavy price: the loss of job, the ruination of career prospects and socia 
and even political castigation. It is not surprising that most of the workforci 
including highly placed managers and directors kept their heads down and continue d 
to attempt to work an increasingly moribund system. No one welcomes the fe 
I 
brave individuals who pointed to the absurdities even though much of what they saif 
was true. 
Many western commentators have also not been helpful, crowing over th 
downfall of the Soviet system or claiming a vindication of the free market 
western political institutions. Groups of experts trooping over to Poland advising 
setting up of stock markets, advocating wholesale privatisation and the loosening 
all economic restrictions, show very little understanding of the Eastern 
system. To change overnight into a western style economy would be 
difficult and even if it were possible such delights as high unemployment, poverty 
and the creation of an underclass, would inevitably result, along with such spin offs, 
as a resurgence of nationalist demands. 
Already a back-lash to the ‘89 revolution is apparent as the shops still remain 
empty, people are bitterly commenting that “at least under Breshnev there was 
enough food in the shops”, and that “you can’t eat glasnost”. 
Solutions cannot be packaged in the west and bought wholesale like some 
panacea. There are also economic and cultural differences to consider. Bulgaria has 
different traditions and attitudes to Poland as well as different economic strengths 
and weaknesses. What the West can do effectively is offer financial aid, without 
strings! This would not only help the delicate newly-found freedoms to grow, but 
create a much more positive atmosphere of cooperation between East and West. That 
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